Contested Cybersecurity Imaginaries and the Politics of Incident Response
This project draws from Science, Technology & Society (STS) studies to explore how cybersecurity imaginaries are contested, this entails exploring constitutive character of security expertise in stabilising both technical and knowledge infrastructures underpinning cybersecurity. In this regard, I am both concerned with those that maintain the security, stability and resilience of networks and the politics that are often concealed or encoded into the everyday interactions of expert security communities with governments in the management of networks. I depart from the concept of social and socio-technical imaginaries to conceptualise cybersecurity imaginaries and explore the intrinsic tensions that permeate the mundane incident response security operations. Thus, this project is not only committed to revealing infrastructures, but exposing key exercises of power embedded in the stabilisation (or breakdown) of security of networked systems. Situated a context of emerging regulation of data flows and critical infrastructures, exploitation of vulnerabilities by both public and private actors and confusion over responsibilities in national cybersecurity governance, this project is thus concerned with the investigation of the ‘emergence’, rather than ‘existence’, of contemporary forms of power through the analysis of national Computer Incident Response Teams (nCSIRT).
My PhD is supervised by Professor Robin Mansell and Dr. Jean-Christophe Plantin and it is fully funded by LSE’s Studentship.